Exxon Mobil Suit Goes Forward

This morning, there’s interesting news coming out of Washington, D.C. (from Bloomberg News and others) as District Court judge Louis Oberdorfer has ruled that a lawsuit (Doe v. Exxon Mobil, No. 01-1357 (D.D.C.)) brought by Indonesian villagers against Exxon Mobil can survive a motion for summary judgment filed by Exxon Mobil.  According to Judge Oberdorfer, determining whether the company is liable for alleged human-rights abuses is a matter that should be left to a jury.

The case has had a long and very interesting journey, rather like a similar case brought on behalf of Burmese individuals against Unocal, Doe v. Unocal, brought in 1997.  What distinguished Unocal, generally, was that it was essentially the first federal law suit brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act based on standards of international human rights, that was allowed to go forward.

Exxon Mobil, however, does not seem to be based on the same theory.  In 2005, the District Court dismissed the claims based on similar theories, but allowed the case to move forward on claims based on state law.  It is that form of the suit which survives for trial.  The law firm of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll has an excellent page dedicated to their case.

According to Bloomberg, Chevron is also facing suit for alleged abuses in Nigeria.

I’m Sorry, I Can’t Resist

Physical impossibility usually is a good way to defend yourself in a case.  If, say, an incident happened at a cafe at 4:35 in the afternoon, but you were verifiably at work clear across town at the same time, it’s pretty hard to say you did whatever it was that happened.

What about when it’s your physique that’s in question?  That was the issue confronting the 14th Court of Appeals in Houston.  According to Rick Casey of chron.com, an unspecified doctor lost his public indecency appeal because “that which is alleged to have been exposed is too small to have been seen.”

I think it takes a big man to say he’s a smaller man than others.  (I wonder how many other commentators will say essentially the same thing…?  Probably most of ‘em.)

All kidding aside, the case presents one of the most infuriating aspects of criminal defense: the severe limitations of the direct appeal.  The argument on appeal was the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence.  In true appellate fashion, the 14th found the evidence plenty sufficient. (As a side note, Mr. Casey probably rightly declines to name the doctor out of consideration for the family, but the opinion is not sealed or redacted if you know where to find it.  What follows comes from the opinion.)

Just as in the Federal system, Texas courts of appeal, when confronted with an argument that the evidence was legally insufficient, “look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Pretty low standard, when you think about it.  Rightly or wrongly, the jury rules when a conviction is challenged on legal sufficiency grounds.

When the issue is factual sufficiency, however, there’s a slightly different standard.  The court will “view all of the evidence in a neutral light,” and the verdict can be set aside if: “(1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust; or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.”  Nonetheless, the jury rules under this standard as well, and the court of appeals must avoid substituting its judgment for that of the jury.  Tch. Thus, the 14th declined to reverse the conviction.

Not so fast…

In the middle of March, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Joseph Nacchio’s 2007 conviction for insider trading.  But his victory, according to Reuters, might be short-lived, as the Tenth Circuit has agreed to rehear the appeal en banc.  (Link)

There’s a good lesson to learn from the Court’s decision: a victory (defined as reversing a conviction) isn’t always the end of the story.  According to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, rehearings en banc (which means that all the judges in the Circuit will rehear the appeal), are “not favored” and therefore do not ordinarily occur.  Nonetheless, if a rehearing en banc will help ensure uniformity of the Court’s decisions, or if the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance, then a rehearing may be ordered.

The primary thing to take away from the Tenth Circuit’s decision is to realize that the government can ask for the case to be reheard–it isn’t like it is at the trial court if the defendant is acquitted and the case is over.